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Learning Equilibria of Simulation-Based Games
ENRIQUE AREYAN VIQUERIA, CYRUS COUSINS, ELI UPFAL, AMY GREENWALD
We tackle a fundamental problem in empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA), that of learning equilibria of
simulation-based games. Such games cannot be described in analytical form; instead, a black-box simulator can
be queried to obtain noisy samples of utilities. Our approach to EGTA is in the spirit of probably approximately
correct learning. We design algorithms that learn so-called empirical games, which uniformly approximate the
utilities of simulation-based games with finite-sample guarantees. These algorithms can be instantiated with
various concentration inequalities. Building on earlier work, we first apply Hoeffding’s bound, but as the size
of the game grows, this bound eventually becomes statistically intractable; hence, we also use the Rademacher
complexity. Our main results state: with high probability, all equilibria of the simulation-based game are
approximate equilibria in the empirical game (perfect recall); and conversely, all approximate equilibria in the
empirical game are approximate equilibria in the simulation-based game (approximately perfect precision).
We evaluate our algorithms on several synthetic games, showing that they make frugal use of data, produce
accurate estimates more often than the theory predicts, and are robust to different forms of noise.
1 INTRODUCTION
Game theory is the de facto standard conceptual framework used to analyze the strategic interactions
among rational agents in multi-agent systems. At the heart of this framework is the theoretical
notion of a game. In a game, each player (henceforth, an agent) chooses a strategy and earns a
utility that in general depends on the profile (i.e., vector) of strategies chosen by all the agents.
The most basic representation of a game is the normal form, which can be visualized as a matrix
containing all agents’ utilities at all strategy profiles. There are many techniques available to analyze
normal-form games. Analyzing a game means predicting its outcome, i.e., the strategy profiles that
one can reasonably expect the agents to play. Perhaps the most common such prediction is that of
Nash equilibrium [22], where each agent plays a best-response to the strategies of the others:
i.e., a strategy that maximizes their utility. More generally, at an ϵ-Nash equilibrium agents best
respond to other agents’ strategies up to an additive error of ϵ .
This paper is concerned with analyzing games for which a complete and accurate description is
not available.While knowledge of the number of agents and their respective strategy sets is available,
we do not assume a priori access to the game’s utility function. Instead, we assume access to a
simulator from which we can sample noisy utilities associated with any strategy profile. Such games
have been called simulation-based games [36] and black-box games [23], and their analysis is
called empirical game theoretic analysis (EGTA) [12, 39]. EGTA methodology has been applied
in a variety of practical settings for which simulators are readily available, including trading agent
analyses in supply chain management [12, 35], ad auctions [14], and energy markets [16]; designing
network routing protocols [40]; strategy selection in real-time games [30]; and the dynamics of
reinforcement learning algorithms, such as AlphaGo [31].
The aim of this work is to design learning algorithms that can accurately estimate all the equilibria
of simulation-based games. We tackle this problem using the probably approximately correct
(PAC) learning framework [32]. Our algorithms learn so-called empirical games [39], which are
estimates of simulation-based games constructed via sampling. We argue that empirical games so
constructed yield uniform approximations of simulation-based games, meaning all utilities in
the empirical game tend toward their expected counterparts, simultaneously.
This notion of uniform approximation is central to our work: we prove that, when one game Γ is
a uniform approximation of another Γ′, all equilibria in Γ are approximate equilibria in Γ′. In other
words, a uniform approximation implies perfect recall and approximately perfect precision: all true
positives in Γ are approximate equilibria in Γ′, and all false positives in Γ′ are approximate equilibria
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in Γ. Our learning algorithms, which learn empirical games that are uniform approximations of
simulation-based games, thus well estimate the equilibria of simulation-based games.
Estimating all the utilities in an empirical game is non-trivial, in part because of themultiple
comparisons problem (MCP), which arises when estimating many parameters simultaneously,
since accurate inferences for each individual parameter do not necessarily imply a similar degree
of accuracy for the parameters in aggregate. Controlling the family-wise error rate (FWER)—
the probability that one or more of the approximation guarantees is violated—is one way to
control for multiple comparisons. In this work, we consider two approaches to FWER control in
empirical games. The first builds on classical methods, using concentration inequalities to first
establish confidence intervals about each parameter individually, and then applying a statistical
correction (e.g., Bonferroni or Šidák) to bound the probability that all approximation guarantees hold
simultaneously, often incurring looseness in one or both steps. The second is based on Rademacher
averages, which directly bound the error of all parameters simultaneously, by replacing the per-
parameter concentration inequalities with a single concentration inequality, and an additional
data-dependent term, thereby circumventing the looseness inherent in classical methods.
In addition to controlling the FWER in two ways, we also consider two learning algorithms.
The first, which we call global sampling (GS), learns an empirical game from a static sample
of utilities. The second, progressive sampling with pruning (PSP), samples dynamically. Prior
art [8, 24, 25] uses progressive sampling to obtain a desired accuracy at a fixed failure probability by
guessing an initial sample size, computing Rademacher bounds, and repeating with larger sample
sizes until the desired accuracy is attained. Our work enhances this strategy with pruning: at each
iteration, parameters that have already been sufficiently well estimated for the task at hand (here,
equilibrium estimation) are pruned, so that subsequent iterations of PSP do not refine their bounds.
Pruning is compatible with both classical MCP correction methods and with Rademacher averages.
In both cases, pruning represents both a statistical and computational improvement over earlier
progressive sampling techniques.
We empirically evaluate both GS and PSP with a Bonferroni correction on randomly generated
games and finite congestion games [26]. We show that they make frugal use of data, accurately
estimate equilibria of games more often than the theory predicts, and are robust to different forms of
noise. We further show that PSP can significantly outperform GS, the current state-of-the-art [31],
relying on far fewer data to produce the same (and often times, better) error rates.
In the simulation-based games of interest here, a running assumption is that simulation queries
are exceedingly expensive, so that the time and effort required to obtain sufficiently accurate utility
estimates dwarves that of any other relevant computations, including equilibrium computations.
This assumption is reasonable in so-calledmeta-games [30, 39], where agents choice sets comprise
a few high-level heuristic strategies, not intractably many low-level game-theoretic strategies. Thus,
our primary concern is to limit the need for sampling, while still well estimating a game.
Related Work. The goal of empirical game-theoretic analysis is to solve games that are not directly
amenable to theoretical analysis because they can be described only by repeatedly querying a
simulator, and even then their description is necessarily noisy. Most EGTA methods work by first
estimating utilities to construct an empirical game, and then computing an approximate Nash
equilibrium of that game. One approach to estimating utilities is to sample a few strategy profiles,
and then learn from those observations functions that generalize utilities to unseen data [37, 42].
Another line of work proposes sampling heuristics based on, for example, information-theoretic
principles [38], or variance reduction techniques in games with stochastic outcomes where agents
employmixed strategies [4]. To handle particularly complex games, hierarchical game reduction [39]
can be used to reduce the size of the game. Recently, EGTA has been successfully applied in games
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with very large strategy spaces, like StarCraft [30], by restricting their strategy spaces to small sets
of predefined strategies (i.e., heuristics)—in other words, by solving them as meta-games.
One distinguishing feature of our work vis à vis much of the existing EGTA work is that we aim
to estimate all equilibria of a simulation-based game, rather than just a single one (e.g., Jordan et
al. [13]). Notable exceptions include Tuyls, et al. [31], Vorobeychik [34], and Wiedenbeck et al. [41].
The first of these papers shows that all equilibria of a simulation-based game are also approximate
equilibria in an empirical game: i.e., they establish perfect recall with finite-sample guarantees.
The second paper derives asymptotic results about the quality of the equilibria of empirical games:
i.e., they establish perfect precision in the limit, as the number of samples tends to infinity. Our
main theorem unifies these two results, obtaining finite sample guarantees for both perfect recall
and approximate precision. We obtain our results in a manner that generalizes (in theory, if not in
practice) the approach taken by Tuyls, et al. [31], and using Rademacher averages.
The third of the aforementioned works, Wiedenbeck et al. [41], is perhaps closest in spirit to our
own. There the goals, like ours, are to characterize the quality of the equilibria in empirical games,
and to exploit statistical information to save on sampling. Their methods employ bootstrapping [7];
as such, they do not immediately afford any theoretical guarantees. Still, it could be of interest to
test our methods against theirs, under the usual EGTA assumption that little to nothing is known
about how the games’ utilities are distributed; but at first blush, it seems likely that neither would
dominate. Bootstrapping methods usually yield stronger approximation guarantees, but it is easy
to construct examples where they are overly optimistic (e.g., when the sampling distribution is
skewed, or in case there are outliers); thus, for applications that require a high degree of certainty,
bootstrapping would likely not be the preferred method.
Sample complexity bounds are an essential tool in EGTA, as running the simulator is generally
a computational bottleneck. In query complexity work (e.g., [1, 9, 11]), one seeks to bound the
number of samples needed to approximate a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This line of work
differs from our work in at least two critical aspects: (1) sampling is over mixed strategies, not
noisy payoffs, and (2) one seeks a single equilibrium. Noisy payoffs may have little impact on their
own, but when combined with seeking all equilibria, they are substantial, as we must account for
multiple hypothesis testing (motivating our use of uniform convergence bounds). Moreover, since
our methods estimate all equilibria, which essentially requires learning the entire game, lower
bounds from the query complexity literature do not apply. This difference is key; not only does
estimating all equilibria yield a greater understanding of a game, single equilibria are not sufficient
to estimate certain properties, such as the price of anarchy.
Rademacher averages were introduced to the statistical learning theory literature for supervised
learning [2, 17], but have also been used in unsupervised learning problems like mining frequent
itemsets [24], and sampling problems like betweenness centrality approximation [25]. We estimate
Rademacher averages using Monte-Carlo simulations, as suggested by Bartlett and Mendelson [2];
doing so, yields very tight generalization bounds. Although a small number of supervised learning
papers, including learning decision tree prunings [15], take this approach, computation of the
requisite suprema is often intractable, leading most to rely on looser analytical bounds instead.1
In our application domain, namely EGTA as opposed to machine learning, simulations dominate
run time, so effort that is spent computing more accurate bounds is well compensated for in the
simulation savings that ensue.
Outline. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present our approximation framework,
in which we show that equilibria in games are approximable: i.e., they are approximately preserved
1Loose analytical bounds can be valuable, for the insight they provide into when the sample complexity is high or low. We
pursue this approach in Appendix B.
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by uniform game approximations. In Section 3, we present our learning framework, in which we
show that empirical games uniformly converge to their expected counterparts with high probability,
given finitely many samples. We conclude that equilibria in simulation-based games are learnable
from finitely many samples: i.e., approximable with high probability. In Section 4, we present two
algorithms that uniformly learn simulation-based games; the first is expensive but always yields
guarantees, while the second is more statistically efficient, but can exhaust its sampling budget and
fail. Finally, in Section 5, we experiment with these algorithms, showing that they can indeed learn
equilibria, often more efficiently than the theory suggests.
2 APPROXIMATION FRAMEWORK
We begin by presenting standard game-theoretic notions. We then introduce the notion of uni-
form approximation. Given an approximation of one game by another, there is not necessarily
a connection between their properties. For example, there may be equilibria in one game with
no corresponding equilibria in the other, as small changes to the utility functions can add or
remove equilibria. Nonetheless, we show that finding the approximate equilibria of a uniform
approximation of a game is sufficient for finding all the (exact) equilibria of the game itself.
2.1 Basic Game Theory
Definition 2.1 (Pure Normal-Form Game). A normal-form game Γ  ⟨P , {Sp | p ∈ P},u(·)⟩
consists of a set of agents P , with pure strategy set Sp available to agent p ∈ P . We define
S  S1×· · ·×S |P | to be the pure strategy profile space of Γ, and thenu : S → R |P | is a vector-valued
utility function (equivalently, a vector of |P | scalar utility functions up ).
Given a normal-form game Γ, we denote by S⋄p the set of distributions over Sp ; this set is called
agent p’smixed strategy set. We define S⋄ = S⋄1 × · · · × S⋄|P | , and then, overloading notation, we
write u(s) to denote the expected utility of a mixed strategy profile s ∈ S⋄.
A solution to a normal-form game is a prediction of how strategic agents will play the game. One
solution concept that has received a great deal of attention in the literature is Nash equilibrium [22],
a (pure or mixed) strategy profile at which each agent selects a utility-maximizing strategy, fixing all
other agents’ strategies. In this paper, we are concerned with ϵ-Nash equilibrium, an approximation
of Nash equilibrium that is amenable to statistical estimation.
Definition 2.2 (Regret). Given a game Γ, fix an agent p and a mixed strategy profile s ∈ S⋄. We
define T ⋄p,s  {t ∈ S⋄ | tq = sq ,∀q , p}. In words, T ⋄p,s is the set of all mixed strategy profiles
in which the strategies of all agents q , p are fixed at sq . Agent p’s regret at s is defined as:
Reg⋄p (Γ, s)  sups ′∈T ⋄p,s up (s ′) −up (s). By restricting s andT ⋄p,s to pure strategy profiles, agent p’s
pure regret Regp (Γ, s) can be defined similarly.
Note that Reg⋄p (Γ, s),Regp (Γ, s) ≥ 0, since agent p can deviate to any strategy s ′ ∈ Sp , including
sp itself. A strategy profile s that has regret at most ϵ ≥ 0, for all p ∈ P , is an ϵ-Nash equilibrium:
Definition 2.3 (ϵ-Nash Equilibrium). Given ϵ ≥ 0, a mixed strategy profile s ∈ S⋄ in a game Γ
is an ϵ-Nash equilibrium if, for all p ∈ P , Reg⋄p (Γ, s) ≤ ϵ . At a pure strategy ϵ-Nash equilibrium
s ∈ S , for all p ∈ P , Regp (Γ, s) ≤ ϵ . We denote by E⋄ϵ (Γ) the set of mixed ϵ-Nash equilibria, and by
Eϵ (Γ), the set of pure ϵ-Nash equilibria. Note that Eϵ (Γ) ⊆ E⋄ϵ (Γ).
2.2 Approximating Equilibria
In this section, we show that equilibria can be approximated with bounded error, given only a
uniform approximation. Specifically, our main theorem establishes perfect recall, in the sense
that the approximate game contains all true positives: i.e., all (exact) equilibria of the original
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game. It also establishes approximately perfect precision, in the sense that all false positives in the
approximate game are approximate equilibria in the original game.
We define the ℓ∞-norm between two compatible games, with the same agents sets P and strategy
profile spaces S , and with utility functions u, u ′, respectively, as follows:2
∥Γ − Γ′∥∞  ∥u(·) −u ′(·)∥∞  sup
p∈P,s∈S
|up (s) −u ′p (s)| .
While the ℓ∞-norm as defined applies only to pure normal-form games, it is in fact sufficient to use
this metric even to show that the utilities of mixed strategy profiles approximate one another. We
formalize this claim in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 (Approximations in Mixed Strategies). If Γ, Γ′ differ only in their utility functions,
u and u ′, then supp∈P,s ∈S⋄ |up (s) −u ′p (s)| = ∥Γ − Γ′∥∞.
Proof. For any agent p and mixed strategy profile τ ∈ S⋄, up (τ ) = ∑s ∈S τ (s)up (s), where
τ (s) = ∏p′∈P τp′(sp′). So, up (τ ) − u ′p (τ ) = ∑s ∈S τ (s)(up (s) − u ′p (s)) ≤ sups ∈S |up (s) − u ′p (s)|, by
Hölder’s inequality. Hence, supτ ∈S⋄ |up (τ ) −u ′p (τ )| ≤ sups ∈S |up (s) −u ′p (s)|, from which it follows
that supp∈P,τ ∈S⋄ |up (τ ) − u ′p (τ )| ≤ ∥Γ − Γ′∥∞. Equality holds for any p and s that realize the
supremum in ∥Γ − Γ′∥∞, as any such pure strategy profile is also mixed. □
Definition 2.5. Γ′ is said to be a uniform ϵ-approximation of Γ when ∥Γ − Γ′∥∞ ≤ ϵ .
Uniform approximations are so-called because the bound between utility deviations in Γ and Γ′
holds uniformly over all players and strategy profiles. This notion is central to our work.
Theorem 2.6 (Approximability of Eqilibria). If two normal-form games, Γ and Γ′, are uniform
approximations of one another, then:
(1) E(Γ) ⊆ E2ϵ (Γ′) ⊆ E4ϵ (Γ)
(2) E⋄(Γ) ⊆ E⋄2ϵ (Γ′) ⊆ E⋄4ϵ (Γ)
Proof. First note the following: if A ⊆ B, then C ∩A ⊆ C ∩ B. Hence, since any pure Nash
equilibrium is also a mixed Nash equilibrium, taking C to be the set of all pure strategy profiles,
we need only show 2. We do so by showing E⋄γ (Γ) ⊆ E⋄2ϵ+γ (Γ′), for γ ≥ 0, which implies both
containments, taking γ = 0 for the lesser, and γ = 2ϵ for the greater.
Suppose s ∈ E⋄γ (Γ), for all p ∈ P . We will show that s is (2ϵ +γ )-optimal in Γ, for all p ∈ P . Fix an
agent p, and defineT ⋄p,s  {τ ∈ S⋄ | τq = sq ,∀q , p}. In words,T ⋄p,s is the set of all mixed strategy
profiles in which the strategies of all agents q , p are fixed at sq . Now take s∗ ∈ argmaxτ ∈T ⋄p,s up (τ )
and s ′∗ ∈ argmaxτ ∈T ⋄p,s u ′p (τ ). Then:
Regp (Γ, s) = u ′p (s ′∗) −u ′p (s)
≤ (up (s ′∗) + ϵ) − (up (s) − ϵ)
≤ (up (s∗) + ϵ) − (up (s) − ϵ)
≤ (up (s∗) + ϵ) − (up (s∗) − ϵ − γ ) = 2ϵ + γ
The first line follows by definition. The second holds by Lemma 2.4 and the fact that Γ′ is a uniform
ϵ-approximation of Γ, the second as s∗ is optimal for p in Γ, and the third as s is a γ -Nash in Γ. □
2We use sup in this definition, rather than max, because the space of mixed strategy profiles is infinite.
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3 LEARNING FRAMEWORK
In this section, we move on from approximating equilibria in games to learning them. We present
algorithms that learn so-called empirical games, which comprise estimates of the expected utilities
of simulation-based games. We further derive uniform convergence bounds, proving that our
algorithms output empirical games that uniformly approximate their expected counterparts, with
high probability. Therefore, the equilibria of these empirical games approximate those of the
corresponding simulation-based games, with high probability.
3.1 Empirical Game Theory
We start by developing a formalism for modeling simulation-based games, which we use to formalize
empirical games, the main object of study in empirical game-theoretic analysis.
Definition 3.1 (Conditional Normal-Form Game). A conditional normal-form game ΓX 
⟨X, P , {Sp | p ∈ P},u(·)⟩ consists of a set of conditions X, a set of agents P , with pure strategy set
Sp available to agent p, and a vector-valued conditional utility function u : S × X → R |P | . Given a
condition x ∈ X, u(·;x) yields a standard utility function of the form S → R |P | .
Definition 3.2 (Expected Normal-Form Game). Given a conditional normal-form game ΓX together
with distribution D , we define the expected utility function u(s;D) = Ex∼D [u(s;x)], and the
corresponding expected normal-form game as ΓD  ⟨P , {Sp | p ∈ P},u(·;D)⟩.
Expected normal-form games serve as our mathematical model of simulation-based games. They
are sufficient not only to model arbitrary black-box games, but additionally games where the rules
are known but environmental conditions are random (e.g., auctions where bidder valuations are
random, or deterministic war games where initial armies and terrain are random), as well as games
with randomness, where X is taken to be a PRNG seed or entropy source.
Definition 3.3 (Empirical Normal-Form Game). Given a conditional normal-form game ΓX together
with a distribution D from which we can draw samples X = (x1, . . . ,xm) ∼ Dm , we define the
empirical utility function uˆ(s;X )  1m
∑m
j=1u(s;x j ), and the corresponding empirical normal-
form game as ΓˆX  ⟨P , {Sp | p ∈ P}, uˆ(·;X )⟩.
Observation 3.1 (Learnability). Consider a conditional normal-form game ΓX together with a
distributionD andX ∼ Dm , and the corresponding expected and empirical games, namely ΓD and ΓˆX .
If, for some ϵ,δ > 0, PX ∼Dm (
ΓD − ΓˆX ∞ ≤ ϵ) ≥ 1 − δ , then the equilibria of ΓD are learnable: i.e.,
the equilibria of ΓˆX estimate the equilibria of ΓˆD up to additive error ϵ with probability at least 1 − δ .
Proof. Taking Γ to be ΓD and Γ′ to be ΓˆX , the dual conclusions of Theorem 2.6 hold with
probability at least 1 − δ . □
Our present goal, then, is to “uniformly learn” empirical games (i.e., obtain uniform convergence
guarantees) from finitely many samples. As per Observation 3.1, we can then apply the machinery of
Theorem 2.6 to infer guarantees on the equilibria of simulation-based games. As already noted, this
learning problem is non-trivial because it involves multiple comparisons. We describe two potential
solutions, both of which are intended to control the FWER. The first is a classical method: it applies
a Bonferroni correction to multiple per-parameter confidence intervals derived via Hoeffding’s
inequality; the second uses Rademacher averages. Both approaches yield bounds on the rate at
which all utility estimates converge to their expectations.
3.2 Hoeffding’s Inequality
Hoeffding’s inequality for sums of independent bounded random variables can be used to obtain
tail bounds on the probabilities that empirical utilities differ greatly from their expectations. In the
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next theorem, we use this inequality to estimate a single utility value, and then apply a union bound
to estimate all utility values simultaneously. Note that this theorem applies only to finite games:
i.e., games for which the index set I ⊆ P × S is finite. Given a finite game, we state all bounds for
an arbitrary index set I ; then, taking I = P × S , our bounds imply bounds on ∥u(·;D) − uˆ(·;X )∥∞.
Theorem 3.4 (Finite-Sample Bounds for expected Normal-Form Games via Hoeffding’s
Ineqality). Consider finite, conditional normal-form game ΓX together with distribution D and
index set I ⊆ P × S such that for all x ∈ X and (p, s) ∈ I , it holds that up (s;x) ∈ [−c/2, c/2], where
c ∈ R. Then, with probability at least 1 − δ overX ∼ Dm , we may bound the deviation betweenu(·;D)
and uˆ(·;X ) for a single (p, s) ∈ I , and for all (p, s) ∈ I , respectively, as:
(1)
up (s;D) − uˆp (s;X ) ≤ c√ ln (2/δ )2m
(2) sup
(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) − uˆp (s;X ) ≤ c√ ln (2 |I |/δ )2m
At a high-level, the first claim follows immediately from Hoeffding’s inequality, and the second,
via a union bound. A formal proof of this theorem appears in Appendix A.
By assuming independence among agents’ utilities, and then applying a Šidák rather than a
Bonferroni correction, a slightly tighter bound was derived previously [31].3 Note, however, that
utilities in simulation-based games could very well exhibit dependencies. For example, imagine
a simulation-based game where agents’ utilities depend on the weather: e.g., on snowy winter
days, all utilities are high, while on rainy winter days, they are all low. To learn the utilities in this
game, one could first sample the weather, and then sample utilities conditioned on the weather.
Our bound holds in this case, so long as (only) the weather samples are independent. That utilities
are independent, assuming an arbitrary black-box simulator, is a needlessly strong assumption.
3.3 Rademacher Averages
Because Hoeffding’s inequality assumes only bounded noise, it is often a loose bound, particularly
for random variables that are tightly concentrated in a relatively small region of their domain.
Theorem 3.4 and Section 4.2 in [31] both use Hoeffding’s inequality to first bound individual utilities,
and then combine those individual bounds using a statistical correction procedure (i.e., Bonferroni
and Šidák, respectively). Unfortunately, these corrections amplify the errors: e.g., Theorem 3.4
requires an O(√ln |I | ) factor increase in the widths of the confidence intervals.
In contrast, Rademacher averages—which intuitively resemble permutation tests—bound the
deviation between (potentially infinitely) many utilities and their expectations directly. For very
large games, a Rademacher-based approach can yield bounds that are significantly tighter than
classical methods. For small and medium-sized games, however, they are often looser. Nonetheless,
we show that under natural conditions, they are never looser by more than a constant factor.
There are two equivalent definitions of Rademacher averages, one with families of sets, which is
often more natural for unsupervised learning problems, and one with families of functions, which
is usually more convenient for supervised learning. We present yet a third, isomorphic, definition,
which facilitates the analysis of expected normal-form games.
Definition 3.5 (Rademacher Averages of Expected Normal-Form Games). Consider a conditional
normal-form game ΓX together with distribution D and take index set I ⊆ P × S . Suppose
3Specifically, we use P(A ∨ B) ≤ P(A) + P(B), whereas previous work [31] assumes independence and uses P(A ∨ B) =
1 − (1 − P(A))(1 − P(B)).
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X  (x1, . . . ,xm) ∼ Dm , and take σ ∼ Rademacherm ; the Rademacher distribution is uniform on ±1.
We define:
(1) 1-DrawEmpiricalRademacherAverage (1-ERA): Rˆ1m(Γ, I , X , σ )  sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m ∑mj=1 σjup (s ;x j )
(2) Rademacher Average (RA): Rm(Γ, I , D)  EX ,σ
[
Rˆ1m(Γ, I , X , σ )
]
Observe that the 1-ERA can be computed exactly from one draw ofX and σ , whereas computing
the RA involves taking an expectation over these random variables. The RA is used to obtain tail
bounds on the quality of estimates, but since the ERA is tightly concentrated about the RA, the
ERA can also be used for this purpose.
Theorem 3.6 (Finite-Sample Rademacher Bounds for Expected Normal-Form Games).
Consider conditional normal-form game ΓX together with distribution D and index set I ⊆ P × S such
that for all x ∈ X and (p, s) ∈ I , it holds thatup (s;x) ∈ [−c/2, c/2], where c ∈ R. Then, with probability
at least 1 − δ overX ∼ Dm , we may bound the deviation betweenu(·;D) and uˆ(·;X ) over all (p, s) ∈ I
with the 1-ERA and the RA, respectively, as:
(1) sup
(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) − uˆp (s;X ) ≤ 2Rˆ1m(Γ, I , X , σ ) + 3c√ ln (1/δ )2m
(2) sup
(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) − uˆp (s;X ) ≤ 2Rm(Γ, I , D) + c√ ln (1/δ )2m ≤ c
√
ln(|I | )
2m + c
√
ln (1/δ )
2m
A proof of Theorem 3.6 appears in Appendix A.
Observe that the 1-ERA bound, Theorem 3.6 (1), has no explicit dependence on the number of
parameters |I | being estimated; thus, unlike a correction-based approach, this bound can scale
to arbitrarily large games (including infinite games) without necessarily incurring additive error
Ω(√ln |I | ). Moreover, the upper bound on the RA, Theorem 3.6 (2), shows that the Rademacher
bounds are never asymptotically worse than those obtained via Theorem 3.4.
On the other hand, the 1-ERA is a data-dependent quantity; thus, it does not yield strong a priori
bounds. Still, the 1-ERA bound can be much tighter than the RA upper bound, in which case the
bounds of Theorem 3.6 may outperform those of Theorem 3.4. For example, when utility values are
correlated with respect to D , then the supremum is over correlated variables, which is generally
smaller than a supremum over uncorrelated variables—strongly correlated sets of variables behave
like single variables in the supremum. Even under anticorrelation, as in constant-sum games, we
obtain this benefit, due to the absolute value in the 1-ERA definition. Additionally, if some (p, s) ∈ I
experience more noise than others, the low-noise indices should have a small effect on the 1-ERA,
as they are less likely than high-noise indices to realize the supremum.
In Appendix B, we design stylized games with particular properties for which we can prove
that the bounds of Theorem 3.6 are significantly tighter than those of Theorem 3.4. Crucially, this
performance holds regardless of whether it is known a priori that such properties hold. Consequently,
the Rademacher bounds are an attractive choice when we suspect a game is well-behaved, but
have insufficient a priori knowledge to prove it possesses any particular property that would imply
strong statistical bounds, as is typical of the simulation-based games analyzed using EGTA.
Remark 3.7. The second bound in Theorem 3.6 tells us that the Rademacher bounds are never
asymptotically worse than those obtained via Theorem 3.4. Their small-sample performance,
however, is inferior. Indeed, we can derive the minimum game size in which the former may
outperform the latter by setting c
√
ln(2 |I |/δ )/2m = 3c√ln(1/δ )/2m, and solving for |I | . Doing so yields
|I | = 1/2δ 8. Taking δ = 0.1, we obtain a minimum |I | of 5 × 107. Solving games of this magnitude is
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not entirely out of reach, even today, and with future increases in computing power, the asymptotic
efficiency of the Rademacher bounds will only become more attractive.
Remark 3.8. While estimating an arbitrary game requires estimating |P |∏ |P |i=1 |Sp | parameters,
many games are defined by far fewer parameters. Symmetric games, for example, where all
agents’ strategy sets are identical, and utilities depend only on the strategy an agent chooses and
the number of other agents that choose each strategy (not the agents’ identities), can be substantially
smaller. Learning such games is easier; as fewer parameters need to be estimated, we can obtain
tighter statistical bounds from the same number of samples.
Remark 3.9. Rademacher and Hoeffding bounds are just two possible choices of concentration
inequalities. Both require bounded noise, but this is not an inherent limitation of our approach. We
could obtain similar results under varied noise assumptions; e.g., we could assume (unbounded)
subgaussian or subexponential noise, and substitute the appropriate Chernoff bounds.
4 LEARNING ALGORITHMS
We are now ready to present our algorithms. Specifically, we discuss two Monte-Carlo sampling-
based algorithms that can be used to uniformly learn empirical games, and hence ensure that the
equilibria of the games they are learning are accurately approximated with high probability. Note
that our algorithms apply only to finite games, as they require an enumeration of the index set I .
A conditional normal form game ΓX , together with a black box from which we can sample
distribution D , serves as our mathematical model of a black-box simulator from which the utilities
of a simulation-based game can be sampled. Given strategy profile s , we assume the simulator
outputs a sample up (s,x), for all agents p ∈ P , after drawing a single condition value x ∼ D .
Our first algorithm, global sampling (GS), is a straightforward application of Theorems 3.4
and 3.6. The second, progressive sampling with pruning (PSP), iteratively prunes strategies,
and thereby has the potential to expedite learning by obtaining tighter bounds than GS, given the
same number of samples. We explore PSP’s potential savings in our experiments (Section 5).
4.1 Global Sampling
Our first algorithm, GS (Algorithm 1), samples all utilities of interest, given a sample sizem and a
failure probability δ , and returns the ensuing empirical game together with an ϵˆ determined by
either Theorem 3.4 or Theorem 3.6 that guarantees an ϵˆ-uniform approximation.
More specifically, GS takes in a conditional game ΓX , a black box from which we can sample
distribution D , an index set I ⊆ P × S , a sample size m, a utility range c such that utilities are
required to lie in [−c/2, c/2], and a bound type Bound, and then drawsm samples to produce an
empirical game ΓˆX , represented by u˜(·), as well as an additive error ϵˆ , with the following guarantee:
Theorem 4.1 (Approximation Guarantees of Global Sampling). Consider conditional game
ΓX together with distribution D and take index set I ⊆ P × S such that for all x ∈ X and (p, s) ∈ I ,
up (s;x) ∈ [c/2, c/2], for some c ∈ R. If GS(ΓX,D , I , P × S,m,δ , c,Bound) outputs the pair (u˜, ϵˆ), then
with probability at least 1 − δ , it holds that sup(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) − u˜p (s) ≤ ϵˆ .
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3.4 when Bound = Hoeffding and Theorem 3.6 when
Bound = 1-ERA. □
4.2 Progressive Sampling with Pruning
Next, we present PSP (Algorithm 2), which, using GS as a subroutine, draws progressively larger
samples, refining the empirical game at each iteration, and stopping when the equilibria are approx-
imated to the desired accuracy, or when the sampling budget is exhausted. Although performance
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Algorithm 1 Global Sampling
1: procedure GS(ΓX,D , I ,m,δ , c,Bound)→ (u˜, ϵˆ)
2: input: Conditional game ΓX , black box from which we can sample distribution D , index
set I , sample sizem, failure probability δ , utility range c , and bound type Bound.
3: output: Empirical utilities u˜,∀(p, s) ∈ I , and additive error ϵˆ .
4: X ∼ Dm ▷ Drawm samples from distribution D
5: u˜p (s) ← uˆp (·;X ),∀(p, s) ∈ I ▷ Compute empirical utilities
6: if Bound = 1-ERA then
7: σ ← Rademacherm
8: r ← Rˆ1m(Γ, I , X , σ ) ▷ 1-ERA of ΓD
9: ϵˆ ← 2r + 3c√ln(1/δ )/2m ▷ 1-ERA bound
10: else if Bound = Hoeffding then
11: ϵˆ ← c√ln(2 |I |/δ )/2m ▷ Hoeffding bound
12: end if
13: return (u˜, ϵˆ)
14: end procedure
ultimately depends on a game’s structure, PSP can potentially learn equilibria using vastly fewer
resources than GS, when fewer data are necessary to learn to a desired degree of accuracy.
As the name suggests, PSP is a pruning algorithm. The key idea is to prune (i.e., cease estimating
the utilities of) strategy profiles that (w.h.p.) are provably not equilibria. Recall that s ∈ Eϵ (Γ) iff
Regp (Γ, s) ≤ ϵ , for all p ∈ P . Thus, if there exists p ∈ P s.t. Regp (Γ, s) > ϵ , then s < Eϵ (Γ). In the
search for pure equilibria, such strategy profiles can be pruned.
For mixed equilibria, a strategy s ∈ Sp is said to ϵ-dominate another strategy s ′ ∈ Sp if, for any
pure strategy profile s , taking s ′ = (s1, . . . , sp−1, s ′, sp+1, . . . , s |P |), it holds that up (s) + ϵ ≥ up (s ′).
The ϵ-rationalizable strategies Ratϵ (Γ) are those that remain after iteratively removing all ϵ-
dominated strategies. Only strategies in Ratϵ (Γ) can have nonzero weight in a mixed ϵ-Nash
equilibrium [10]; thus eliminating strategies not in Ratϵ (Γ) is a natural pruning criterion.
If a strategy s ∈ Sp is ϵ-dominated by another strategy s ′ ∈ Sp , then p always regrets playing
strategy s , regardless of other agents’ strategies. Consequently, the mixed pruning criterion is more
conservative than the pure, so more pruning occurs when learning pure equilibria.
Like GS, PSP takes in a conditional game ΓX , a black box from which we can sample distribution
D , a utility range c , and a bound type Bound. Instead of a single sample size, however, it takes in a
sampling scheduleM in the form of a (possibly infinite) strictly increasing sequence of integers; and
instead of a single failure probability, it takes in a failure probability schedule δ , with each δt in this
sequence and their sum in (0, 1). These two schedules dictate the number of samples to draw and
the failure probability to use at each iteration. PSP also takes in a boolean Pure that determines
whether the output is pure (or mixed) equilibria, and an error threshold ϵ , which enables early
termination as soon as equilibria of the desired sort are estimated to within the additive factor ϵ .
In the PSP pseudocode, and in the following theorem, we overload the Reg and E operators (both
pure and mixed) to depend on a utility function, rather than a game.
Theorem 4.2 (Approximation Guarantees of Progressive Sampling with Pruning). Con-
sider conditional game ΓX together with distribution D such that for all x ∈ X and (p, s) ∈ P × S ,
up (s ;x) ∈ [−c/2, c/2], for some c ∈ R. If PSP(ΓX,D ,M,δ , c,Bound, Pure, ϵ) outputs
((u˜, ϵ˜), (Eˆ, ϵˆ), δˆ ) ,
it holds that:
(1) δˆ ≤ ∑δt ∈δ δt , δˆ ∈ (0, 1).
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Algorithm 2 Progressive Sampling with Pruning
1: procedure PSP(ΓX,D ,M,δ , c,Bound, Pure, ϵ)→ ((u˜, ϵ˜), (Eˆ, ϵˆ), δˆ )
2: input: Conditional game ΓX , black box from which we can sample distribution D , sampling
schedule M , failure probability schedule δ , utility range c , bound type Bound, equilibrium
type Pure, error threshold ϵ .
3: output: Empirical utilities u˜, ∀(p, s) ∈ P × S , utility error ϵ˜ , empirical equilibria Eˆ, equilibria
error ϵˆ , failure probability δˆ .
4: I ← P × S ▷ Initialize indices
5: (u˜p (s), ϵ˜p (s)) ← (0, c/2),∀(p, s) ∈ I ▷ Initialize outputs
6: for t ∈ 1, . . . , |M | do
7: (u˜, ϵˆ) ← GS(ΓX,D , I ,Mt ,δt , c,Bound) ▷ Improve utility estimates
8: ϵ˜p (s) ← ϵˆ,∀(p, s) ∈ I ▷ Update confidence intervals
9: if ϵˆ ≤ ϵ or t = |M | then ▷ Termination condition
10: Eˆ ←
{
Pure : E2ϵˆ (u˜)
¬Pure : E⋄2ϵˆ (u˜)
11: return ((u˜, ϵ˜), (Eˆ, ϵˆ),∑ti=1 δi )
12: end if
13: I ←
{
Pure : {(p, s) ∈ I | Regp (u˜, s) ≤ 2ϵˆ}
¬Pure : {(p, s) ∈ I | sq ∈ Rat2ϵˆ (u˜),∀q ∈ P} ▷ Prune
14: end for
15: end procedure
(2) If limt→∞ ln(1/δt )/Mt = 0, then ϵˆ < ϵ .
Furthermore, if PSP terminates, then with probability at least 1− δˆ , the following hold simultaneously:
(3)
up (s;D) − u˜p (s) ≤ ϵ˜p (s), for all (p, s) ∈ P × S .
(4) If Pure, then E(u) ⊆ E2ϵˆ (u˜) ⊆ E4ϵˆ (u).
(5) If ¬Pure, then E⋄(u) ⊆ E⋄2ϵˆ (u˜) ⊆ E⋄4ϵˆ (u).
Proof. To see 1, note that δˆ is computed on line 11 as a partial sum of δ , each addend and the
sum of which are all by assumption on (0, 1); thus the result holds.
To see 2, note that if limt→∞ ln(1/δt )/Mt = 0, then both the Hoeffding and Rademacher bounds
employed by GS tend to 0, as both decay asymptotically (in expectation) as O(√ln(1/δt )/Mt ) (see
Theorems 3.4 and 3.6). For infinite sampling schedules, the termination condition of line 9 (ϵˆ ≤ ϵ)
is eventually met, as ϵˆ is the output of GS, and thus 2 holds.
To establish 3, we show the following: assuming termination occurs at timestepn, with probability
at least 1 − δˆ , at every t in {1, . . . ,n}, it holds that sup(p,s )∈P×S |up (s;D) − u˜p (s)| ≤ ϵ˜p (s). This
property follows from the GS guarantees of Theorem 4.1, as at each timestep t , the guarantee holds
with probability at least 1 − δt ; thus by a union bound, the guarantees hold simultaneously at all
time steps with probability at least 1 −∑ni=1 δt = 1 − δˆ . That the GS guarantees hold for unpruned
indices should be clear; for pruned indices, since only error bounds for indices updated on line 7
are tightened on line 8, it holds by the GS guarantees of previous iterations.
Without pruning, 4 and 5 would follow directly from 3 via Theorem 2.6, but with pruning, the
situation is a bit more involved.
To see 4, observe that at each time step, only indices (p, s) such that Regp
(
u˜(·), s ) > 2ϵˆ are
pruned (line 13), thus we may guarantee that with probability at least 1 − δˆ , Regp
(
u(·;D), s ) > 0.
Increasing the accuracy of the estimates of these strategy profiles is thus not necessary, as they do
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not comprise pure equilibria (w.h.p.), and they will never be required to refute equilibria, as these
will never be a best response for any agent from any strategy profile.
5 follows similarly, except that nonzero regret implies that a pure strategy profile is not a
pure Nash equilibrium, but it does not imply that it is not part of any mixed Nash equilibrium.
Consequently, we use the more conservative pruning criterion of strategic dominance (a strategy
is dominated if it is not rationalizable), requiring 2ϵ-dominance in u˜, as this implies nonzero
dominance in u. □
Finally, we propose two possible sampling and failure probability schedules for PSP,M and δ ,
depending on whether the sampling budget is finite or infinite. Given a finite sampling budget
m < ∞, a neutral choice is to take M to be a doubling sequence such that ∑Mi ∈M Mi ≤ m,
with M1 sufficiently large so as to possibly permit pruning after the first iteration (iterations
that neither prune nor achieve ϵ-accuracy are effectively wasted), and to take δt = δ/|M |, where
δ is some maximum tolerable failure probability. This strategy may fail to produce the desired
ϵ-approximation, as it may exhaust the sampling budget first. If we want to guarantee a particular ϵ-
δ -approximation, thenwe can takeM to be an infinite doubling sequence, andδ to be a geometrically
decreasing sequence such that
∑∞
t=1 δt = δ , for which the conditions of Theorem 4.2 (2) hold.
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we describe the performance of our learning algorithms, experimentally. We demon-
strate that they consistently outperform their theoretical guarantees, in multiple experiments with
random games, under various noise conditions. Moreover, we show that in cases of interest, PSP
consistently requires fewer data than GS.
We start by describing the games we designed for these experiments; we then present our
findings. We use the notationU [a,b], where a < b, to denote the uniform distribution, both in the
discrete case (a,b ∈ N) and in the continuous case (a,b ∈ R). Unless otherwise noted (i.e., in the
empirical success rate experiments), δ is fixed at 0.1 throughout.
5.1 Experimental Setup
Uniform Random Games. For k ∈ Z+,u0 ∈ R, a game Γ drawn from a uniform random game
distribution RG(|P |,k,u0) has |P | agents where each agent p has k pure strategies. The utilities for
each agent p in each profile s are drawn i.i.d. as up (s) ∼ U (−u0/2, u0/2), where u0 > 0 is a parameter
controlling the magnitude of the utilities. We set u0 = 10.
Finite Congestion Games. Congestion games are a class of games known to exhibit pure strategy
Nash equilibria [26]. We use this class of games in our experiments for precisely this reason, so
that we can more easily identify equilibria.
A tuple C = (P ,E, {Sp | p ∈ P}, { fe | e ∈ E}) is a congestion game [5], where P = {1, . . . , |P |}
is a set of agents and E = {1, . . . , |E |} is a set of facilities. A strategy sp ∈ Sp ⊆ 2E is a set of facilities,
and fe is a (universal: i.e., non-agent specific) cost function associated with facility e .
In a finite congestion game, each agent prefers to select, among all their available strate-
gies, one that minimizes their cost. Given a profile of strategies s , agent p’s cost is defined as
Cp (s) = ∑e ∈sp fe (ne (s)), where ne (s) is the number of agents who select facility e in s . We experi-
ment with simple cost functions of the form fe (n) = n.
For |P | ∈ Z+, |E | ∈ Z+,k ∈ Z+ such that k ≤ 2 |E | − 1,4 a finite congestion game C drawn
from a random congestion distribution RC(|P |, |E |,k) is played by |P | agents on |E | facilities. Each
agent p is assigned a random number
Sp  ∼ U [1,k] of pure strategies. Each pure strategy sp, j ∈
4We constrain k ≤ 2|E | − 1, not k ≤ 2|E | , so that no agent’s strategy set is empty.
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Sp is constructed as follows. The probability that facility e ∈ {1, . . . , |E |} is included in sp, j is
given by the power law P[e ∈ sp, j ] = α−e , where α ∈ [0, 1]. We report results for α = 0.1. This
distribution is a simple but useful model of situations where agents’ preferences are clustered
around a few preferred facilities. Power law models abound in the literature; they are used to model
distributions of population in cities, of incomes, and of species among genera, among many other
applications [20, 29].
Noise simulation. To test our algorithms, we query a black-box simulator to obtain noisy samples
of the agents’ utilities. Given a game Γ, a sample of agent p’s utility at strategy profile s is given by
up (s,x) = up (s) + x , where x ∼ U (−d/2, d/2) and i.i.d.. The parameter d controls the magnitude of
the noise. This simple model is meant to capture situations where it is hard or even impossible to
make accurate distributional assumptions about noise.
5.2 Experimental Results
ϵ as a function of the number of samples. For these experiments, we ran the GS algorithm using
1-ERA bounds on 200 games drawn at random from RC(5, 5, 2) using different levels of noise,
namely d ∈ {2, 5, 10}. In Figure 1 (a), we report 95% confidence intervals around the error tolerance
ϵ , as a function of the number of samplesm. We see that the average error ϵ decreases roughly
as 1/√m. These findings are typical of games drawn from distribution RC with |P | ∈ {2, . . . , 10},
m = {2, . . . , 5}, and k ∈ {1, . . . , 4}.
Similar findings were obtained for games drawn from distribution RG.
Fig. 1. Performance of GS with 1-ERA bounds. (a) 95% confidence intervals around ϵ for games drawn from
RC(5, 5, 2) using different levels of noise, namely d ∈ {2, 5, 10}. (b) Frequency of pure 2ϵ-Nash equilibria in
one game with 32 strategy profiles drawn from distribution RC(5, 5, 2) with noise parameter d = 2.
2ϵ-Nash learning as a function of the number of samples. In these experiments, we ran the GS
algorithm using 1-ERA bounds on one game with 32 strategy profiles drawn from distribution
RC(5, 5, 2) with noise parameter d = 2. This game has a unique pure Nash equilibrium.
Figure 1 (b) depicts four histograms, corresponding to four different sample sizes, each one
plotting the frequencies of strategy profiles deemed pure 2ϵ-Nash equilibria, using exhaustive
search and applying Theorem 4.1 to the error returned by GS. The profiles not shown had zero
frequency. The unique pure Nash equilibrium is correctly identified in all cases. Moreover, as the
number of samples increases, the frequency of false positives (i.e., profiles that are not Nash but
are deemed so by GS) decreases.
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Empirical success rate. In these experiments, we ran the GS algorithm using 1-ERA bounds and
Hoeffding’s bound with a Bonferroni correction on 200 games drawn at random from RC(3, 3, 2)
and another 200 games drawn at random from RG(3, 3), both with d = 5.
In Figure 2 (a), we report 95% confidence intervals around the empirical success rate, meaning the
ratio of the number of times the algorithm’s output satisfies E(ΓD ) ⊆ E2ϵ (ΓˆX ) and E2ϵ (ΓˆX ) ⊆ E4ϵ (ΓD )
to the total number of times it executes. As per our guarantees, this rate should be above the black
line 1 − δ (and it is). Note that we test these containments only for pure ϵ-Nash equilibria.
To test the extent to which the bounds computed by GS are tight, we contract the value of ϵ
output by GS by a factor ρ ∈ {1.0, 0.875, 0.75, 0.625, 0.5}. Even so, GS consistently meets its 1 − δ
guarantee, and in these experiments design, it is very often the case that guarantees are met with
empirical probability close to 1, except when ρ = 0.5 and δ < 0.15.
Evaluation of PSP. We now compare the performance of GS to PSP with a doubling schedule
initialized at 100 samples. (As usual, we fix δ = 0.1.) Since our experimental testbed only includes
small games, we present results only for the (Bonferroni) correction-based variants of these algo-
rithms, leaving experiments using Rademacher averages for future work. Our procedure to fairly
compare them is as follows. We first run PSP with ϵ = 0, thereby forcing the algorithm to run to
completion. In this way, we obtain the error rate corresponding to PSP’s final GS invocation. We
call this quantity ϵˆPSP, and we denote byMPSP the total number of samples used upon termination.
Now, since GS takes in a number of samples which is used uniformly across all players and strategy
profiles to produce error rate ϵˆGS, we compute ϵˆGS assuming GS runs on MPSP/NΓ samples. In other
words, we assume a uniform budget of MPSP/NΓ samples per up (s). This strategy guarantees both
algorithms use the same total number of samples.
Figure 2 (b) depicts ϵˆ , the approximation guarantee obtained for both algorithms, as a function
of the number of samples, summarizing the results of experiments with 200 games of different
sizes drawn from a RG distribution, with |P | ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} and k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.5 Game size, NΓ , is the
number of parameters, meaning the number of utilities to be estimated, which equals the number
of players times the number of strategy profiles. The plot shows ϵˆPSP in orange and ϵˆGS in grey, on
a logarithmic scale, thereby demonstrating that, for the same number of samples, PSP yields better
approximations: i.e., smaller values of ϵˆ . Note, however, that PSP relies on having sufficiently many
strategy profiles to prune in the first place. For smaller games NΓ ∈ {8, 24} and relatively small
values of ϵ , GS produces slightly better approximations, because there is relatively little opportunity
for pruning. For larger games NΓ ∈ {324, 1024}, PSP consistently yields better approximations, and
moreover, the error rate improves as a function of the size of the game.
Future experimental work. Thus far, we have only experimented with learning pure strategy
ϵ-Nash equilibria. Our experiments are small enough that we can use exhaustive search to deter-
mine ground truth. Computing mixed strategy Nash equilibria is intractable (PPAD-complete) [6];
accordingly, estimating them remains a challenge.
Having said that, a potentially interesting statistical vs. computational trade-off exists that
warrants further investigation when the goal is to estimate mixed strategy equilibria. While fully
computing Ratϵ (Γ) may incur statistical savings by avoiding sampling profiles that are deemed
non-equilibria early on, iteratively computing Ratϵ (Γ) comes at a computational cost.
The experiments we have run thus far, in simple, synthetic environments, were designed to
illustrate the advantage of our algorithms in a controlled setting. In future work, we plan to
study more complicated games, including large enough games so that bounds that are game-size
dependent—such as those that require correction procedures, cf. Theorem 3.4—are statistically
5Similar behavior was observed for RC with with |P | ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8}, |E | ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}, and k = 2.
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Fig. 2. GS vs. PSP. (a) Empirical success rate for 200 games drawn at random from RC(3, 3, 2) and another
200 games drawn at random from RG(3, 3), both with d = 5. (b) GS vs. PSP for 200 games of different sizes
drawn from a RG distribution, with |P | ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} and k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}.
intractable. Since our algorithms are agnostic to the noise distribution, we will also test their
robustness to other forms of noise, such as multiplicative and unbounded noise.
6 SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
This work is a contribution to the theoretical literature on empirical game-theoretic analysis, a
methodology for the analysis of multi-agent systems. One important future-work application
for our techniques is equilibria estimation in meta-games. Meta-games are simplified versions
of intractably large games, where, instead of modeling every possible strategy an agent might
implement, one analyzes a game with a substantially reduced set of strategies, each of which is
usually given by a complicated algorithmic procedure (i.e., a heuristic). For example, one might
analyze a reduced version of the game of Starcraft [31] where agents play according to higher-level
strategies given by reinforcement learning algorithms: e.g., variants of AlphaGo [28]. Simulation is
in order; and since each run of the game can result in either agent winning (depending on various
stochastic elements, including possibly the agents’ strategies), one can only obtain noisy utilities.
Our techniques are directly applicable to the construction of empirical meta-games, and provide
guarantees on the quality of the equilibria of the corresponding simulation-based meta-games.
Our methodology is also applicable in the area of empirical mechanism design [35], where
the mechanism (game) designer wishes to optimize the rules of a game so that the ensuing equilibria
achieve certain goals. For example, a network designer might want to minimize congestion assuming
selfish agents [27]. In related work, we extend our methodology so that we can learn empirically
optimal mechanisms, under appropriate assumptions [33].
While uniform ϵ-approximations allow us to estimate equilibria, not all properties of games can
be estimated using approximations. For example, while a uniform ϵ-approximation allows us to
estimate welfare to within |P |ϵ additive error, they are not sufficient to estimate the welfare of
the worst (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium, because the worst Nash equilibrium in Γ′ could be
arbitrarily better or worse than the worst equilibrium in Γ, and even the worst 2ϵ-Nash equilibrium
in Γ′ could be arbitrarily worse than the worst Nash equilibrium in Γ. Thus quantities like the
price of anarchy are also difficult to estimate, even given a uniform ϵ-approximation.
Traditional approaches to empirical game-theoretic analysis, including past theory that employed
statistical analysis, applied solely to finite games. Likewise, our learning algorithms depend on an
enumeration of all agents’ utilities at all pure strategy profiles. Our Rademacher bounds, however,
do not require the finite assumption; they apply even to games with an infinite number of utilities,
Enrique Areyan Viqueria, Cyrus Cousins, Eli Upfal, Amy Greenwald 16
including countably infinite (or uncountably infinite, subject to standard measurability concerns)
agents and/or pure strategies. In future work, we will extend our methods to use function approx-
imators in infinite games, and establish uniform convergence from only a finite sample, under
alternative assumptions: e.g., Lipschitz utilities in games with finitely many agents and bounded,
continuous pure strategy spaces. Finally, we also hope to replace the generic McDiarmid concen-
tration inequalities used to show the Rademacher bounds with tighter concentration inequalities,
after making additional assumptions, such as uniformly bounded variance.
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APPENDIX
A PROOFS OF CONCENTRATION INEQUALITIES
Proof of Theorem 3.4. Applying a union bound to Hoeffding’s inequality yields:
P
(
sup
(p,s )∈I
 Ex∼D [up (s;x)] − 1m m∑j=1 up (s;x j )
 ≤ ϵ
)
≥ 1 −
∑
(p,s )∈I
2e−2ϵ
2m/c2 = 1 − 2 |I | e−2ϵ2m/c2
Setting δ = 2 |I | e−2ϵ2m/c2 and solving for ϵ yields the result. □
Lemma A.1 (Symmetrization Ineqality). Given expected game ΓD , with utility functionu(·;D),
sample X ∼ Dm , and empirical utility function uˆ(·;X ), it holds that
E
X ∼Dm
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) − uˆp (s;X ) ] ≤ 2Rm(Γ, I , D) .
Proof. In the proof below, suppose X ′ = (x ′1, . . . ,x ′m) ∼ Dm . The step labeled See Above
follows, as x ′j and x j are i.i.d., thus multiplying by a Rademacher random variable doesn’t change
the outer distribution over which the expectation is taken, as two equiprobable events are swapped.
E
X
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) − uˆp (s;X ) ]
= E
X
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 EX ′
[
1
m
m∑
j=1
up (s;x ′j )
]
− 1
m
m∑
j=1
up (s;x j )

]
Definition of Expected Nfg
≤ E
X ,X ′
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 up (s;x ′j ) −up (s;x j )

]
Jensen’s Ineqality
Linearity of Expectation
= E
X ,X ′,σ
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 σj (up (s;x ′j ) −up (s;x j ))

]
See Above
≤ E
X ′,σ
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 σjup (s;x ′j )

]
+ E
X ,σ
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 − 1m m∑j=1 σjup (s;x j )

]
Triangle Ineqality
Linearity of Expectation
= 2Rm(Γ, I , D) Definition of Rm(Γ, I , D)
□
Proof of Theorem 3.6. By Lemma A.1, it holds that
E
X ∼Dm
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) − uˆp (s;X ) ] − 2Rˆ1m(Γ, I , σ , X ) ≤ 0 ,
for σ ∼ Rademacherm . Note also that, as up (s;x j ) ∈ [−c/2, c/2], changing any x j results in a change of
no more than 3c/m to this difference. Consequently, by McDiarmid’s bounded difference inequality
[19], the first result holds. N.B. Standard presentations of this result, e.g. [2, 21], apply McDiarmid’s
inequality twice, on the supremum deviation and the Rademacher complexity (combining via union
bound), yielding a slightly weaker bound; here we apply it only once, directly to their difference.
The second result holds similarly, though changing x j induces no change to the (non-empirical)
Rademacher complexity, thus we apply the bounded difference inequality with c/m. The final upper
bound holds via Massart’s finite class inequality [18]. □
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B RADEMACHER BOUNDS FOR GAMES WITH FACTORED NOISE
In this appendix, we design a class of games, games with factored noise, for which Rademacher
bounds perform well. Crucially, this performance holds regardless of whether or not it is known a
priori that a game is in this class. Consequently, Rademacher bounds are an attractive choice when
we suspect a game is well-behaved, but have insufficient a priori knowledge to prove any particular
property that would imply strong statistical bounds, as is standard in EGTA.
The following theorem upper bounds the RA in games with factored noise. Although our bound
is rather loose, it is often substantially lower than the worst-case estimate of Theorem 3.6. While
computing this bound requires knowledge of the structure of the game, computing the 1-ERA does
not require such knowledge; moreover, we would expect to see similar behavior when the 1-ERA is
used in place of the RA, as the 1-ERA is tightly concentrated about its expectation.
Theorem B.1 (Rademacher Averages of Games with Factored Noise). Consider conditional
normal-form game ΓX together with distributionD and index set I ⊆ P × S s.t. sup(p,s )∈I
up (s;D) ≤ a0.
Suppose further factoring functions η,ϕ such that for all x ∈ X and (p, s) ∈ I ,
up (s;x) = up (s;D) +
n∑
i=1
ηi
(
ϕi (p, s);x
)
,
and for all i ∈ 1, . . . ,n, Image(ηi ) ⊆ [−ai ,ai ] and | Image(ϕi )| ≤ bi . Then
Rm(Γ, I , D) ≤ a0√
m
+
n∑
i=1
ai min
(
1,
√
2 ln(bi )
m
)
.
Proof. This result follows by analyzing the contribution of each factor to the Rademacher
complexity via Massart’s finite class inequality (we use the form given by [3, Theorem 3.3]). In
detail:
Rm(Γ, I , D) = E
σ ,X
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 σjup (s;x j )

]
Definition of R
= E
σ ,X
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 σjup (s,D) +
n∑
i=1
σjηi (ϕi (p, s);x j )

]
Factoring of Γ
≤ E
σ ,X
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 σjup (s,D)

]
+
n∑
i=1
E
σ ,X
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 σjηi (ϕi (p, s);x j )

]
Triangle Ineqality
≤ E
σ ,X
[
sup
(p,s )∈I
 1m m∑j=1 σjup (s,D)

]
+
n∑
i=1
ai min
(
1,
√
2 ln(bi )
m
)
Massart’s Ineqality
≤ a0√
m
+
n∑
i=1
ai min
(
1,
√
2 ln(bi )
m
)
See Below
To see the final step, note that sup(p,s )∈I
 1
m
∑m
j=1 σjup (s;D)
 is always realized by (p, s) with the
largest or smallest expectation (depending on whether
∑m
j=1 σj is positive or negative), the absolute
value of which does not exceed a0. As such, the absolute value can be upper-bounded by the
expected distance travelled in a unit random walk scaled by a0/m, which does not exceed a0/√m. □
As an example, we construct a game with noise that is factored into five additive components, the
first three with scale 1, and the last two with scale 12 ; thus a = ⟨1, 1, 1, 12 , 12 ⟩. The game is enormous;
the number of agents |P | is varied, and each agent has the same set of |S | = 100 strategies available.
The first factor is global noise, independent of the agent or strategy profile; thus ϕ1(p, s) is constant
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and b1 = 1. The second factor is agent noise, so ignores the strategy profile; thus ϕ2(p, s) = p and
b2 = |P |. The third factor is independent per-agent-action noise, which ignores all but the actions
of a particular agent; thus ϕ3(p, s) = sp and b3 = |S | . Finally, the fourth and fifth factors depend
on the strategy profile (but not the agent index), and both the strategy profile and agent index,
respectively; thus b4 = |S | |P | and b5 = |P | |S | |P | .
In Figure 3, we plot the Hoeffding and Rademacher bounds for this game. We see that the former
outperforms the latter for small |P |, but near |P | = 35, the trend reverses. To be conservative, we
plot the upper bound on the Rademacher average (derived in Theorem B.1) using the constant (3)
of the 1-ERA (see Theorem 3.6).
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Fig. 3. Hoeffding vs. Rademacher Bounds for a game with factored noise with (variable) |P | agents, |S | = 100
actions per agent,m = 100 samples, and δ = 0.05.
